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Agriculture  contributes  less  than 8X  of Mexico's  GDP.  Nevertheless,
when in June 1990  Presidents  Salinas  and  Bush  announced  negotiations  on a Free
Trade  Agreement  (FTA)  between  Mexico  and the  US,  it  was clear  that  agriculture
would  be a  major  stumbling  block.  At stake  is  much more than  the  efficiency
gains  that  liberalizing  agriculture,  and  particularly  maize,  would  bring  to
Mexico,  substantial  as  we find them  to  be.  Maize  protection  is Mexico's  de
facto  rural  employment  and  anti-poverty  program,  so distributional  concerns
complicate  the liberalization  process. Further  complications  arise  because,
while  high  maize  prices  almost  certainly  contribute  to rather  than  alleviate
poverty,  rapid  liberalization  would increase  poverty  on the transition  path.
This paper  focuses  on the  distributional  effects  of liberalizing  maize
in  Mexico,  the  policies  that  can  be put  in place  to alleviate  them,  and the
incentive  problems  such  policies  in turn  lead  to.  Our results,  however,  are
of much  wider interest  than the  FTA  negotiations  themselves. Agriculture  has
been a  major stumbling  block  in trade  negotiations  everywhere. Agriculture
has  always  been excluded  from  GATT  negotiations  until  the  recent  Uruguay
round,  which  almost  collapsed  because  of it.  In many  cases  the  reasons  are
similar  to the  ones discussed  in  this  paper.
Transition  problems  like  the  ones  analyzed  in  this  paper  are  likely  to
arise  in  most  major economic  reforms. In  particular,  we focus  on the
implications  for  policy  design  of the  absence  of well functioniug  capital
markets;  on the  welfare  costs  of reforming  only  gradually;  on the incentive
problems  created  by trade  adjustment  policies;  and on the  redistributive
aspects  of policy  reform  in the  presence  of realistic  limits  on the  array  of
intervention  instruments  available  to the  Government.2
Maize is  Mexico's  key crop  and  main  rural  employer;  it  occupies  the
largest  acreage,  it is the  most  costly  in terms  of fiscal  subsidies,  and it is
the  most  protected 1l.  It is  grown  by subsistence  farmers,  mostly  in rain-fed
lands;  it is also  grown  by medium  and large  scale  farmers  in rain-fed  and
irrigated  lands.  Since  irrigated  lands  have  higher  yields,  the  latter  groups,
who are  not among  the  poor,  receive  large  infra-marginal  rents.  Only  0.32 of
every  peso of subsidy  reaches  subsistence  farmers  (Levy  and  van  Wijnbergen
(1991)).
Tortillas,  Mexico's  main staple  food,  are  mainly  made from  maize.  The
government  subsidizes  tortillas,  but the  subsidies  fail  to fully  offset  the
effects  of maize  protection;  thus  the  rural  poor are  taxed  on their  main
consumption  good.  For  landless  workers  and  the 65X  of  maize  producers  whose
land is so  marginal  that  they  are  actually  net  maize  buyers,  this tax  exceeds
the  subsidy  they  receive  as producers.z3
We show that  liberalization  lowers  the  value  of rain-fed  land,  thus
hurting  the  sub-set  of the rural  poor  who own land  by reducing  the  rents
derived  from  this  asset.  This  would lower  the  value  of the  main asset  farmers
can  collateralize,  reducing  their  access  to credit  at the  very moment  when
such  access  is  needed  most.  Liberalization  also lowers  the  demand  for  rural
labor. And since  migration  links  rural  and  urban  labor  markets,
I/  Import  controls  support  a price  70X  above  the  world  price (allowing  for
transport  costs  ance  quality  differentials);  42X  of the  total  arable  land is
allocated  to this  crop,  which  employs  one out  of three  rural  workers;
subsidies  to  maize  and tortillas  cost  about  US$ 1  billion  in 1991.
&/  In  urban  areas  the  tax is  partly  offset  by deliveries  of tortillas  through
the 'tortivale'  program. Under  this  program  each  urban  family  earning  less
than two  minimum  wages  receives  one  kilo of tortillas  per  day free.  This is
less  than  daily family  consumption,  so the  program  is infra-marginal.3
liberalization  of maize  lowers  wage rates  across  the  board.  The  effects  of
liberalization  thus  spill-over  to the  urban  poor.
Lump-sum  transfers  are  not a feasible  option  in  Mexico,  so other
policies  to  protect  the  poor are  needed. Moreover,  Mexico's  poor have limited
access  to capital  markets,  access  which  may in fact  be reduced  by the
liberalization  because  it lowers  land  prices. Hence,  these  policies  must  not
only  focus  on steady-state  welfare,  but  also  on the  transition  period. And
because  the  FTA is a permanent  shock,  these  policies  should  also  facilitate
change  towards  other  activities.
In section  2  we sketch  an inter-temporal  model  to trace  the impact  on
households'  welfare  of Mexico-US  free  trade  in  agriculture,  and  of different
adjustment  policies. In section  3  we quantify  the  trade-offs  between  the
speed  of liberalization  and  the  size  of the  efficiency  gains;  we also  study
the  impact  on labor  and land  markets. Section  4 designs  a program  to
facilitate  adjustment  towards  free  trade  in  maize  that  protects  the  rural  poor
during  the  transition. Political  economy  considerations  that  bear on the
design  of this  program  are addressed  in  section  5.  Section  6  concludes.
2.  Model Structure
2.1  Static  RelationshiDs
The economy  is divided  into  an  urban  and  a rural  sector. The  urban
sector  produces  only a tradeable  industrial  good  and  a non-tradeable  services
good.  Each  of these  goods  is produced  with fixed  intermediate  inputs  and a
Cobb-Douglas  technology  for  urban labor  and sector-specific  capital.
Land  and rural  labor  produce  five  tradeable  goods  in the  rural  sector:
maize,  other  basic grains,  fruits  and  vegetables,  other  agricultural  goods,
and  livestock. We distinguish  between  rain-fed  (TI)  and irrigated  (T2)  land,4
because  yields  and land/labor  ratios  for  the  same  crop differ  between  types  of
land.  We include  tortillas  as a pure  consumption  good.  Tortillas  are  non-
traded,  but  by assumption  perfectly  elastically  supplied  at the  zero-profit,
tax/subsidy  inclusive  price;  their  price  depends  only  on the  producer  price  of
maize  and  any taxes  or subsidies.
We distinguish  six types  of  houselholds,  classified  by ownership  of
factors  of production. Four  are in  rural  areas:  landless  rural  workers,  whose
only  asset  is labor;  subsistence  farmers,  who on average  own  two  hectares  of
rain-fed  land,  work their  own  land  and  participate  in the  rural  labor  market;
rain-fed  farmers,  who  own the  remainder  of the  rain-fed  land  and  half of the
land  used  for livestock;  and  owners  of irrigated  land,  who own  the irrigated
land,  and  the  other  half of livestock  land.  Neither  rain-fed  nor irrigated
farmers  supply  labor. Urban  workers  supply  all  urban  labor,  and  urban
capitalists  own  the  urban  capital  stock.
Urban  workers,  landless  rural  workers  and  subsistence  farmers  all  have
the  same  preferences,  as do rain-fed  and irrigated  land  owners  and  urban
capitalists. The first  group  allocates  a much larger  share  of expenditure  to
rural  goods than  the  second,  so changes  in food  prices  have a much larger
impact  on the  first  group'/.
Migration  plays  an important  role in determining  the  incidence  of
changes  in agricultural  protection. While  migration  to the  US has attracted
most international  attention,  rural-urban  migration  inside  Mexico  is
quantitatively  more important. Mexico's  rapid  urban  growth  has been largely
J/  Preferences  are  given  by a  nested  Cobb-Douglas/CES/CES  utility  function.
The  outer  nest CD allocates  expenditures  between  a composite  rural  good,
industry  and services.  The  next CES  nest  aggregates  the  five rural  goods  into
a composite  rural  good.  The last  CES  nest  distributes  maize  consumption
between  raw  maize  and  tortillas.5
by such  migration,  and involves  numbers  in  excess  of any  available  estimate  of
the  number  of Mexican  migrants  currently  in the  US (Garcia  y Griego  (1989)).
We therefore  focus  on internal  migration,  and  assume  that  migration
flows  keep the  ratio  of  per-capita  utility  differentials  between  landless
rural  workers  (the  most likely  migrants)  and  urban  workers (the  most likely
target  group)  constant. We use utility  differentials  rather  than  wage
differences  (as  in the  Harris-Todaro  m4odel)  because  urban  transfers  like the
tortivale  program  also affect  migration  choices. We capture  all such  effects
by focusing  on total  utility. With LrU  the  stock  of migrants  from  rural  to
urban  areas,  U. and  Uu  per  capita  utility  of a  worker  in the  rural  and  urban
areas,  respectively,  and the  superscripz  0 an initial  equilibrium,  we get:
Llu  = kf  (U/UU) /  (L/U,") ]  - k  ;  k> O  1n2  (1 )
where  vi  is the  elasticity  of migration  to urban-rural  utility  differentials.
Keeping  utility  differentials  constant  is  achieved  by setting  v very  high.
We distinguish  physical  (the  actual  physical  hectares  of land  allocated
to  a particular  crop)  from  effective  land (the  amount  actually  usable). The
relationship  between  them is:
t  =  s.1;  ;s>,0¢<  (2)
where  - denotes  effective  land;  the  subscript  j  refers  to the  four
agricultural  goods.  Equation  (2)  is intended  to capture  incentives  for crop
rotation  and  other  practices  that  preclude  allocating  all  land  to a single
crop.  Irrigated  land  is assumed  to  be better  than rain-fed  in  that  01,  02 j,
so that  diminishing  returns  set  in more  slowly  than in  rain-fed  lands. Hence,
for  the same  price  change,  the  supply  response  in irrigated  lands  is stronger.
Agricultural  production  functions  exhibit  constant  returns  to scale  to
labor  and  effective  land;  thus  value  added  in  maize,  m, in rain-fed  lands  is:6
VAZm  LRI  =Ol  LRn  1Ols  l  TiTlmln
=  pI,  LRm 1 *  Ti Al,
LRl1,  TIm  are rural  labor  and  raiLi-fed  lands  allocated  to maize;  Pl 5 rIM02
and  Al 5 - Xlw*alm  Similar  functions  apply  to the  other  agricultural  products
in  both types  of land.  Since  0  <  A <  a  <  1, there  are  diminishing  returns  to
physical  land  for  given  labor  intensity. Thus,  for  a  wide range  of  prices
there  need not  be full  specialization  in agriculture.
Trade interventions  are  modelled  as combinations  of  production  and
consumption  taxes/subsidies.  We also  model  direct  lump-sum  transfers  to urban
workers  through  the  tortivale  program. Such tortilla  deliveries  are infra-
marginal,  and thus  equivalent  to a direct  income  transfer. For given  taxes
and subsidies,  domestic  prices  for  tradeable  goods  follow  world  prices,  as we
assume  domestic  goods  to  be perfect  substitutes  for  world  goods,  and take
world  prices  to  be exogenous. But services  are  non-traded,  so this  market,
like  the  markets  for  rural  and  urban  labor,  and  rain-fed  and irrigated  land,
is  cleared  by prices. Our  model  thus  determines,  via the  excess  demand
functions  in (4),  factor  prices  and the  real  exchange  rate:
LR0 (P)  +  Lzu(P)  - LRO°  0
LUD(P)  - Lzu(P)  - LU°  =O
TiD(P)  - Ti =  O  (4)
T2D(P)  - T2  = 0
qs,(P) - qd,(P)  - 0
P contains  the  rural  and  urban  wage rates,  the  rental  rates  on rain-fed  and
irrigated  land,  and  the  price  of services  (the  real  exchange  rate). The
vectors  of goods'  supply  and demand  are, respectively,  qs and  qd, the
subscript  s refers  to services,  and  the  superscript  D denotes  the  market7
demand  for a  particular  type  of labor  or land.  LRO  and  LUO  are the  initial
distribution  of the total  labor  force  so that in the  base case  LVO-  0.
2.2 Inter-Temporal  Relationships
At each  period  the  economy  is described  by the  excess  demand  functions
in (4). But from  one time  period  to the  next  the  economy  changes  ac a result
of exogenous  and  policy-induced  changes. The  exogenous  changes  are: (i)
growth  of labor  and  populations',  (ii)  Hicks-neutral  technical  change,  (iii)
growth  of the  urban  capital  stock5J,  (iv)  government  spending  in non-
agriculture  items,  and (v)  the  path  of world  prices. Importantly  for  our
results,  we assume  that  the  rate  of growth  of productivity  in rain-fed
agriculture  is lower  than  in irrigated  agriculture. This reflects  the  fact
that  high yielding  varieties,  pesticides,  fertilizers  and other  innovations
are  easier  to implement  in irrigated  lands.
We model two  policy-induced  changes  to alter  the  economy's  growth  path:
trade  policy  and  agriculture  investments. Within  trade  policy,  attention
focuses  on the  sectors  where  liberalization  occurs,  on the  date  at which
changes  start,  and  on the  speed  at which  they  take  place. Within  agriculture
investments,  we focus  on the  size  and  time-profile  of irrigation  investments.
Investments  in irrigation  infrastructure  change  the  endowments  of
irrigated  and  rain-fed  land  with  a 1-period  gestation  lag:
4/  To reflect  Mexico's  demographic  transition,  the  rate  of growth  of labor,
3X,  is set  higher  than  the  rate  of growth  of population,  2X.  During  the
transition  period,  see  below,  the  rate  of growth  of labor  slowly  declines
until  in the  steady-state  it equals  that  of population. Thus,  households  who
own labor  initially  grow faster  than  households  who own  only land  or capital.
V/  In a fuller  model  of the  impact  of the  FTA, investment  rates  in industry
and services  would  clearly  be endogenous. Here,  however,  we are interested  in
the  effects  of changes  in agricultural  liberalization  only.8
Tic  1  TIC-,  - RIXti  T2;  r'  T2t. 1 +  Rt-l)
RI is the  number  of hectares  of rain-fed  land  transformed  to irrigated  land.
Owners  of rain-fed  land (subsistence  peasants  and  rain-fed  farmers)  are
assumed  to  benefit  from irrigation  investments  in proportion  to the initial
share  of rain-fed  land  held  by eqch  group. The investments  are  paid for  by
the  government. The real  resource  costs  of irrigation  are  an increasing
function  of the  stock  of irrigated  land,  reflecting  the  fact that  as these
investments  increase,  lands  of poorer-quality  are  encountered  (greater
distance  from  water  resources,  etc.). We capture  this  by:
tq  =  )(  T2i;  q>O;  y>l  (6)
where  Qt  is an index  of marginal  costs  of irrigation  investments.
The  rates  of growth  of labor  in each  period,  glt,  are  exogenous,  but
migration  responds  to endogenously  determined  utility  differentials,  implying
in turn that  the  urban  and rural  labor  force  are determined  endogenously  by:
LRt  =  (LRt-.,  - Lzu,,)  (1  +  gc- 1)  ;  LUt  - (LUt-I  + Lr 1 tl)  (1  + glt-l)  (7)
2.3  The  Transition  Path  and  the  Steady-State
We divide  the  future  into  a transition  path  and a steady-state. The
transition  path lasts  T-1  years;  the  steady-state  obtains  from  period  T
onwards,  going  out to infinity. All  policy-induced  changes  take  place  during
the transition  period. During  this  period  the  rate of growth  of labor  also
converges  to that  of the  ,->,ulation.  In the  steady-state,  on the  other  hand,
all  households  grow  at the  same  rate,  and the  rate  of growth  of aggregate
output,  which  equals  the  rate of growth  of the  capital  stock,  is  given  by the
sum  of labor  and  productivity  growth.9
Hence,  by assumption,  static  and intertemporal  relative  prices  remain
unchanged  over  the interval  [T,m). This  allows  us to  Hicks-aggregate  the
steady-state  path of the  economy. It suffices  to simply.  calculate  period  T
values,  since  all  future  periods  will  be identical  up to a uniform  scale.
factor  (growth  rate)  for  all  quantities. The aggregation  process  therefore
only  affects  discount  factors  between  T-1  and  T; these  are larger  than  those
between  earlier  periods  because  this 'period'  is  replicated  an infinite  number
of times (again,  up to a uniform  scale  factor  for  all quantities).
Let the  common  and  constant  post-T  grtwth  rate  be g and the  real  world
interest  rate  rw.  Define  6-l/(l+rw)  and 5^-(,+g)/(l+rw),  where  6a  is the
period-to-period  growth-adjusted  discount  factor. Then the  following
expressions  obtain  for  discount  factors  from  year i  back-to-period-l,  6(i):
8 ()  6j1  for  i  < T
for  all  i  > T combined
Consider  now the  Net Present  Value,  NPVy,  of (yt),  where  yt-yt,1(l+g)  for
all t  >  T:
NPV7 =  bt-  r  yty  .t-l  +  8S  (l,g)  (9)
=-  y  Y  t-c  + 6r2-  g  Yrt  7  r  -I  +  (Y)
Thus the  infinite  horizon  is captured  by calculating  period  T only (out  of all
[T,-)  periods),  but adjusting  the  period  T discount  factor  to  equal:
8(T)  8T-1  (10)
2.4  Budget  Constraints  and  Welfare  Measures
Only  urban  capitalists  save  and invest. Private  investment  is driven  by
the  exogenously  given  growth  of the  capital  stock. Private  savings  is a10
constant  proportion  of urban  capitalist's  income. This  proportion  is
exogenous  during  the  transition  period,  but is endogenized  in the  steady-state
to satisfy  t:heir  inter-temporal  budget  constraint. Thus,  if during  the
transition  period  they  accumulated  debt (assets),  the  steady-state  savings
rate is increased  (decreased)  so that  the  discounted  value  at time  T of future
savings  over investment  equals  the  value  of the  debt (assets)  accumulated  up
through  period  T-1; see  the  appendix  for  details.
Household's  welfare  is the  present  discounted  value  of the  time-paths  of
utility  (UhO.  ..  .UhT-l;UhT).  Let  the  rate  of time-preference,  p, be constant
and  equal  for  all  households,  and  use  a CRRA  utility  function  to aggregate
utility  over time.  If a is the inter-temporal  elasticity  of substitution,  we
calculats  welfare  of  household  h as:
'Wh - uh  ( Ct  )  =  ~  1J  1 Uh  X  -t  Uh ( C,)  (-1  a-,-.  gc)  T- Wh__U___C)  ET_rf  Er"CT  (1.  C
2~~1  +  Uh (CT) .8Srz,ef(1
Fli  Uh(Cd-a  I-  6pz.fA
where  =  and  Prof  6  c
where  gc is the  steady-state  rate  of growth  of per-household  consumption.
Because  all  private  households  satisfy  their  inter-temporal  budget
constraint,  the  present  -iscounted  value (PDV)  of the  government  deficit
(surplus),  equals  the  PDV of the  trade  deficit  (surplus),  B.  We do not impose
the  condition  that  B - 0.  Rather,  we measure  the  difference  between  the  PDV
of the  government  deficit  in the  base path,  denoted  by BO,  and  any B generated
by an alternative  path,  and interpret  the  difference  as the  change  in
resources  generated  by the  policy  change. For  each  path  we calculate  the
lump-sum  transfers  (taxes)  required  so that each  household  in each  period  has11
the  same  current  utility  as in the  base  path.  When the  value  of these  income
compensations  are included  as part  of government's  expenditures,  as if in fact
these  compensations  had  been given,  the  difference  between  BO  and  B is the
aggregate  efficiency  gain of any  policy  change.
3.  The Impact  of Free  Trade in  Maize
We study  the implications  of liberalizing  maize  by comparing  a reference
path for  the economy  that  leaves  maize  and  tortilla  policies  at their  present
levels  with  various  alternatives  where  maize  and  tortilla  prices  are  freed-up;
on the  reference  path there  is  no irrigation  investmentil,  and  US protection
of its  Fruits  &  Vegetables  (F&V)  sector  stays  at its  present  level.71
Table  1 shows  the  efficiency  gains  and  distributional  impact  of
eliminating  all taxes  and subsidies  to  maize  and  tortillas. The efficiency
gains  measure  the  increase  in  national  income  assuming  the  government  delivers
lump-sum  transfers  (or  levies)  so that  every  household  has always  the  same
utility  as in the  reference  path.  The  welfare  changes  measure  the  impact  of
various  alternative  adjustments,  but exclude  the  effects  of such transfers.
In this  section  we only focus  on the  first  two  columns,  where  we
evaluate  the  effects  of liberalization  without  any  adjustment  policies. The
first  column  shows  the  impact  of an immediate  elimination  of all  maize  and
§/ Also,  on the  reference  path real  government  spending  and the  capital  stock
in industry  and services  grow  at 4X annually. Productivity  in the  urban
sector  grows  at 2%,  and in  rain-fed  (irrigated)  agriculture  at 0.5 (1.5Z).
2/  We assume  that  protection  to other  agricultural  sectors,  basic  grains  in
particular,  is removed  over  a 5  year  horizon.  This  allows  sharper  focus  on
wliether  to include  maize  in the  FTA,  and  what  kind of supporting  policies  are
advisable.  Because  liberalization  of grains  is already  incorporated  in  the
base scenario,  these  results  only  provide  measures  of the  efficiency  gains
(costs)  from including  (excluding)  maize  in the  FTA.12
tortilla  taxes  and subsidies;  the  second  column  shows  the  effects  of a gradual
change  where  maize  moves  linearly  to  world  prices  over 5  years (so  that in the
sixth  year domestic  and  world  prices  are equal).
Table  1:  Welfare  and  Efficiency  Effects
Maize  1Y  Maize  5Y  Maize  1Y  Maize  5Y  Maize  SY  Maize  6Y
no CNA  no CNA  GPA  CNA  CNA  CNA early
no F&V  no F&V  no F&V  no F&V  F&V  F6V  l
Subsistence  Farmer'  0.967  0.971  1.007  1.011  1.013  1.015
Landless  Rural  Workere  0.984  0.985  0.993  0.995  1.000  1.001
Rain-Fed  Farmer"  0.943  0.949  0.996  1.001  1.000  1.003
Irrigated  Farmere  1.028  1.024  1.019  1.015  1.028  1.025
Urban  Worker  0.984  0.986  0.993  0.995  1.000  1.001
Urban  Capitalist"  1.018  1.017  1.013  1.012  1.007  1.006
Efficiency  Gainsw  42.44  40.08  51.96  49.57  44.81  43.18
Cumulated  Fiscal  Gaine  23.17  21.94  18.04  16.76  13.64  12.50
a/Measured  as a  percentage  of the reference  case.
b/1989  USS  billion;  Mexico's  GDP was  207  billion  in 1989.
Instantaneous  liberalization  leads  to  very large  efficiency  gains.  The
PDV of these  gains  is  US$  42.4  billion. With a growth-adjusted  discount  rate
of about  3%A  ,  these  efficiency  gains  translate  into  US$ 1.22  billion  of
1/  We assume  a (risk-adjusted)  world  real interest  rate  of 7%,  and  long term
rates  of technical  progress  and  population  growth  such that  steady-state
growth  is  4X.  The growth-adjusted  discount  rate  thus is 2.91 (-(1.07/1.04-
1)*100),  implying  a growth-adjusted  discount  factor  of 0.972.13
additional  consumption  per  annum,  or 0.6%  of 1989  GDP.  This is a  very
significant  number  for  gains  from  removing  taxes  and  subsidies  to only  two
commodites:  maize  and tortillas.  The  efficiency  gains  of gradual
liberalization  are less,  at US$  40.1  billion,  but actually  not  by very  much.
Distributing  the  adjustment  over a five  year  period  reduces  the  net  discounted
value  of the  efficiency  gains  by only  5.5%.  Thus the  efficiency  costs  of a
more gradual  approach  do not seem  large  when compared  to the  benefits  that
maize liberalization  eventually  leads  to.
But the  aggregate  efficiency
gains  have  substantial  distributional  Rural  Product Wages
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rural  product  wages  are adversely
affected  by the  cut in  maize  prices. While  maize  is less labor-intensive  than
fruits  and  vegetables,  it is  more labor-intensive  than  all  other  activities  in
agriculture,  hence  rural  product  wages  fall  once  maize  prices  go down.
Table  2 shows  the  discounted  value  of all  current  and  future  rental
income  for  both types  of land. Column  1 indicates  that  the  value  of rain-fed
land  drops  by almost  251  under  immediate  liberalization,  clearly  a very
significant  capital  loss.  This is  because  most  maize is  grown  in rain-fed
lands,  where substitution  possibilities  towards  other  crops  are  much  more
limited  than  on irrigated  land.  The  value  of irrigated  land  actually  goes  up.14
Because  both substitution  possibilities  and labor-intensity  are  higher  in
irrigated  lands,  the  positive  effect  of lower  rural  product  wages  offsets  the
negative  impact  of lower  maize  prices.
Table  2:  Land  Values  end  Land-Holdingsl
Rain-fed  Land  Irrigated  Land-holdings  of  Land-holdings  of
Land  Subsistence  and  Irrigated  farmers
Rain-fed  farmers
Base  Case  12.065  40.169  12.065  40.169
Case 1:  0 year adjustment,  no CNA Program  9.231  40.800  9.231  40.800
Case Z: 5 year adjustment,  no CNA program  9.443  40.725  9.443  40.725
Case 3: 0  year adjustment,  with CNA program  9.180  40.668  11.499  40.668
case 4:  5  year adjustment,  with CNA  program  9.390  40.597  11.703  40.597
case 5:  5  year adjustment,  with CIA  program,  9.608  42.175  12.030  42.175
acceass  to  US F&V market
case 6:as  5.  but maize price cuts  take last  6  9.726  42.137  12.141  42.137
years & start one year after  CIA program
a/million  pesos of 1989  per  hect.are. 
Contrasting  the  fall in land  values  with the  reduction  in rural  product
wages,  it is clear  that  a larger  part  of the  adjustment  falls  on land.  The
reason  for  this is that  labor  is  more  mobile  than land.  Labor  can  be re-
allocated  within  agriculture  towards  other  crops  with much  more ease than
rain-fed  land,  and in  addition  some  of the impact  on labor  is  shifted  to urban
workers  through  rural-to-urban  migration.
Figure  2 shows  the  migration  response. Note first  that  under  the
reference  case  migration  is substantial. Long-term  productivity  trends  do not
favor  agriculture,  particularly  not rain-fed  agriculture. This,  together  with
the  exhaustion  of land  on the  extensive  margin,  makes  it clear  that  even  with
current  maize  policies  future  migration  will  be substantial. The model
predicts  a cumulative  migration  of  almost  1.2  million  workers  over the  next
decade. Such large  migration  suggests  that  maize  protection  as a rural15
employment  policy  is likely  to fail
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also increases  migration  over  the
reference  case,  but does so  at a slower  pace.  However,  after  the  adjustment
is  over,  the  cumulative  amount  of migration  is the  same.  Table  1 shows
what these  factor  price  developments
imply  for  households'  welfare. Rural
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consumption  wage is less  than  the
fall  in the rural  product  wage.
Subsistence  farmers  own rain-fed  land  and  hire  out as day laborers  to
other  farmers;  they  are thus  doubly  hit as  both the  value  of their  land  drops
by 25X,  and their  labor  income  declines  in line  with the  drop in rural  wages
(though  they  also  benefit  from  lower  consumer  prices). The  situation  is  more16
complex  for  rain-fed  and irrigated  farmers. They  both lose  because  of lower
maize  prices,  but they  gain  because  of lower  rural  wages (since  they  are  both
net  users  of labor). These  two  factors  are  capitalized  in land  prices,  and
the  balance  is clear  from  table  2: rain-fed  farmers  lose  substantially,  while
irrigated  farmers  experience  a small  gain. Note that  under  gradual
liberalization  values  of rain-fed  land  fall  less than  under  immediate,  since
protection-induced  rents  can  be reaped  for  five  additional  years.
Figure  4 illustrates  how this
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increasing  as a result  of  higher  urban  employment,  capitalists  are  better  off.
To sum  up: the  efficiency  gains  of liberalization  in the  absence  of
adjustment  policies  are substantial,  but unevenly  distributed. Immediate
liberalization  produces  larger  gains,  but gradualism  is  not  very costly;  the
aggregate  efficiency  gains  foregone  during  the  five  year transition  are  small.
But the  converse  of this is that  gradualism  barely  mitigates  the  welfare  loss
for  the  groups  affected. Of course,  prolonging  the  liberalization  over  more
than  five  years  further  insulates  the  groups  concerned  from  welfare  losses,
but  also further  reduces  the  aggregate  efficiency  gains. The issue  is
tnerefore  not only  how fast  to liberalize,  but  also  what measures  are  taken
during  the  transition  to transfer  some  of the  efficiency  gains  to the  groups
most affected  by it.  How this  can  be done is  the subject  of the  next section.
4. What TvDe  of Trade  Adjustment?
The inclusion  of Mexican  agriculture  into  the  FTA is a  permanent  change.
A  poverty-minded  adjustment  program  for  such  a change  should  therefore  have
two  objectives:  first,  transfer  income  to those  among  the  poor that  are
adversely  affected. Second,  facilitate  their  finding  alternative  sources  of
income. The  major  problem  in the  design  of such  a program  is that  the  first
objective  usually  conflicts  with the  second. 21
A program  designed  to  help maize  producers  would  provide  incentives  to
increase,  or at least  maintain,  maize  production,  because  benefits  would
decrease  with lower  output;  such  a program  would  discourage  farmers  from
searching  for  alternative  activities. Moreover,  if the  benefits  are
significant,  the  program  would  also  provide  incentives  for  rent-seeking  and
.2/ cf Diamond  (1982)  for  this  point.18
graft;  the  number  of 'registered'  maize  producers  would  soon  exceed  the  rural
population. This is  particularly  important  in  Mexico,  where  administrative
capacity  is  weak,  as are  records  of farm  size  and  output. But,  more
fundamentally,  a program  focused  on transfering  income  to  maize  producers
fails  to alter  underlying  conditions  in agriculture. For the  adjustment
program  to  be transitory,  it  must increase  the  productivity  of the  factors
owned  by the  groups  affected  by the  policy  change,  so that after  the  program
ends  these  groups  do not  need further  assistance. Section  3 indicates  that  in
Mexico's  case this  translates  into  programs  that  can increase  land  values  and
stimulate  the  permanent  demand  for rural  labor.
Table  2 indicates  that  at free  trade  prices  the  average  rental  rate  on
irrigated  land  is four times  that  of rain-fed  land.  Thus  a program  of
investments  in land improvements  has a substantial  potential  for  increasing
land  productivity.i0/  Such  a program  is  particularly  promising  because
private  irrigation  investment  has  been discouraged  by land  tenure  problems  and
explicit  regulation,  while  public  investment  has  been curtailed  for  budgetary
reasons.  W  As a consequence,  the  return  on such  a program  is likely  to  be
high.
A public  investment  program  focused  on land improvements  generates
transitory  demand  for rural  labor. By supporting  the  rural  wage rate  during
the  construction  period  it  eases  the  transition  towards  free trade  for
landless  rural  workers  and  subsistence  farmers;  and  by slowing  down  migration
1Q/  We refer  to a program  of 'land  improvements'  to emphasize  that  it involves
not  only irrigation  infrastructure,  but also investments  in drainage,  land
levelling,  ditch-clearing,  etc.
I/  See Sanchez  Ugarte  (1991)  for  a description  of water's  regulatory  regime
in  Mexico.19
it  helps insulate  urban  workers  from  the  policy  change. And because  irrigated
land is about  2.4 times  more labor-intensive  than  rain-fed  (at  the  free  trade
crop  composition),  the  program  stimulates  the  permanent  demand  for  rural
labor. Thus,  once  the  program  is finished  it  continues  to provide  employment
opportunities  in  the  rural  areas.
But the  program  also  helps  to increase  the  value  of the  land  owned  by
subsistence  and  rain-fed  farmers. As some  of their  land  is improved  with
irrigation  and  drainage,  the  capital  loss  suffered  due  to removal  of
protection  is  reduced.  This in turn  restores  the  value  of their  main
collateral  and enhances  their  access  to credit.  In  addition,  transforming  land
from rain-fed  to irrigated  lowers  risks  faced  by farmers  and  augments  crop
choice. This facilitates  a permanent  adjustment  away  from  maize  cultivation.
Simulations  three  and four  explore  such  a program. In  both simulations
we assume  that  a total  of 1.1  million  hectares  of land  are transformed  from
rain-fed  to irrigation,  with investments  beginning  in the  second  year and
lasting  a total  of five  years!V;  in simulation  three  maize  and tortilla
prices  are liberalized  immediately,  while simulation  four  assumes  a pari-passu
five  year adjustment  path for  price  liberalization  and  irrigation  investments.
Table  1 shows  that  the  efficiency  gains  of maize  liberalization
accompanied  by irrigation  investments  are  over  20%  higher  than in  the  absence
of irrigation  (with  slightly  larger  gains  when liberalization  is immediate).
Moreover,  the  efficiency  gains  when gradual  liberalization  is accompanied  by
the irrigation  program  exceed  by almost  17%  the  gains  from immediate
12/  The  program  is assumed  to irrigate  0.25  million  hectares  in  each  of the
first  three  years,  0.20 in the  fourth  and 0.15 in the  fifth.  This  program  is
feasible  given  Mexico's  previous  experience  in this  area.  We refer  to the
program  as the 'CNA  program'  because  it  would  be implemented  by the  Comision
Nacional  del  Agua,  Mexico's  agency  in  charge  of irrigation  construction.20
liberalization  without  adjustment  program. Clearly,  the  potential  gains  from
irrigation  investments  are large. This increased  efficiency  has two  sources:
one,  the  four-to-one  difference  in the  level  of productivity  of irrigated  vs.
rain-fed  land.  Two, an increase  in the  average  rate  of technical  change  in
agriculture:  technical  change  is faster  in irrigated  land,  and the  program
increases  the  share  of total  arable  land  that  is irrigated.
Equally  interesting  are  the  distributive  effects  of the  program. Column
4 of table  1 indicates  that  the  two  groups  directly  dependent  on the  value  of
rain-fed  land  are  both better  off  when gradual  liberalization  is accompanied
by the irrigation  program. The  reason  for  this is shown  in table  2: although
land  prices  are almost  the  same  as in simulations  1 and 2 (the  differences
resulting  from  different  behavior  of wage  rates),  the  value of the  land
holdings  of these  two  groups  is almost  restored  to the  pre-liberalization
levels,  as now these  groups  hold  a mix  of rain-fed  and  irrigated  land.
Figure  6 shows  that  rural  wage
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the  welfare  of landless  rural  workers
and  urban  workers  is almost  restored  to the  protection  level  (cf.  table  1).
The converse  of this tightening  in the  labor  market  is reflected  in  urban21
capitalists  and irrigated  farmers'  welfare,  which is correspondingly
diminished  (though  still  higher  than  under  protection).
Figure  7 depicts  the  time-path
of utility  for  rain-fed  farmers  for  4.2  Utility  Rain-Fed  Farmers
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of  irrigation  investments.  For  them,
the  initial  impact  of  the  CNA  program  is a tightening  of the  rural  labor
market,  with negative  implications  for  second-period  utility. It is only
after  the  third  year,  when the irrigation  works  come  on stream,  that  the
benefits  of land improvements  out-weigh  the  costs  of  higher  rural  wages. And
though  their  welfare  is  higher  than  on  the  reference  path,  it  takes  five  years
for  current-period  utility  to  be  higher.  This  interaction  between  the  path  of
price  declines  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  timing  of  irrigation  investments,  on
the  other,  determines  when  the  different  groups  receive  the  benefits  of  the
adjustment  program.  All  this  is  masked  by  the  discounted  value  of  utility,
but  such  timing  issues  can  be  very  important  for  the  political  economy  aspects
of  the  reform  (cf  the  next  section).
The  scenarios  presented  so  far  have  ignored  any  change  in  US protection
towards  Mexico's  export  crops.  Simulation  five  considers  a  scenario  where  the
gradual  liberalization  of  the  Mexican  maize  market  is accompanied  by a gradual
liberalization  over  the  same  five  year  period  of the  US market  for  fruit  &22
vegetables,  the  sector  with the  most significant  agricultural  trade  barriers
in  the  USL3/.  We assume  that  this  simultaneous  trade  liberalization  is
accompanied  by the  same five  year CNA  program  considered  before.
Consider  first  the  distributional  effects  of improved  market  access.  to
the  US fruit  & vegetable  market. This  policy  combination  generates  a Pareto
improvement  vis-a-vis  the  reference  case:  the  welfare  of all  households  is at
least  equal  to the  protection  situation,  and  for  some  there  is a gain.
Because  fruits  and  vegetables  is the
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via  higher  wage rates.  By reducing
labor  displacement,  it facilitates  the  transition  towards  free  trade  in  maize.
Irrigated  farmers  are  more than  compensated  for  the  higher  rural  wages
by higher  prices  for  fruits  &  vegetables:  their  welfare  increases  (table  1).
But  rain-fed  farmers  profit  little  from improved  export  prices  for  fruits  and
vegetables,  but  must  pay  higher  wages;  thus,  they  constitute  the  only group  in
the  rural  areas  who do  not  benefit  directly  from  a comprehensive  FTA.
J3/ These  barriers  are equivalent  to a 20X  tariff  (Feenstra  and  Rose (1991)).
But  because  the  sector  labelled  here 'fuits  and  vegetables'  includes  other
crops (cf  the  data  appendix)  the  tariff  is  scaled  back to 5%.  Thus prices
faced  by Mexican  fruit  and  vegetable  exporters  increase  by 1% during  each  of
the  five  years  of adjustment,  and then  stay  constant  at the  higher  level.23
Next,  consider  the  effects  of the  US liberalization  on aggregate
efficiency. Table  1 shows  that  the  ag;regate  efficiency  gains  in  simulation
five  are  slightly  lower  than in four,  which  has the same  path for  maize  prices
and  irrigation  investments. This seemingly  paradoxical  result  fol,ows  from
second-best  effects. Because  of the  urban-rural  wage differential,  re-
allocating  labor  from  rural  to  urban  areas  gives,  ceteris  paribus,  efficiency
gains. By slowing  down  migrdtion,  the  gradual  liberalization  of the  US market
diminishes  the  size  of the  gains  from  labor  re-allocation  into  urban  areas.
Consider  next the  fiscal  impact
FISCAL  COSTS  MAIZE  & RR.  INTERVENTIONS
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cost  of maize  production  subsidies,
(ii)  the  revenue  from  tortilla  taxes,  (iii)  the  cost  of the  tortivale  program;
and, for  simulations  3 and  4, (iv)  the  cost  of irrigation  investments>/.
On the  reference  path the  fiscal  costs  of  maize interventions  actually
decline  through  time.  This is  because  tortilla  consumption,  which  under
current  policies  is taxed,  grows  faster  than  subsidized  maize  production.
When irrigation  investments  are  undertaken,  the  fiscal  position  initially
deteriorates,  but then improves  after  the  fifth  or sixth  year.  With gradual
14/ Investment  costs  reflect  the  time-profile  of the  CNA  program  and the
increased  marginal  costs  of irrigating  lower  quality  lands.  The last 150,000
hectares  are, on average,  49%  more expensive  than  the first  250,000.24
liberalization,  this  deterioration  is initially  quite  sharp,  because  only
small  savings  are  made  each  year on the  costs  of maize  interventions.  With
immediate  liberalization,  the  savings  from  maize interventions  actually
dominate  the  costs  of irrigation  investments  in the  first  year,  and the  fiscal
costs  over  the  next four  years  are  smaller  than in the  case  of gradual
liberalization.  After  the  sixth  year,  when the  irrigation  program  is
complete,  both alternatives  generate  lower  costs  than  current  policiesL51.
Table  1 indicates  the  net  fiscal  impact  of each alternative:  the  net
present  value  of the fiscal  surplus  in simulation  three  (four)  is 3.5% (3.2%)
higher  than  on the  reference  path.  Current  maize  policies  cost  more than  the
adjustment  programs  proposed  to ease  the  transition  to free trade.
5. On the  Pace  of Adiustment
Much of the  economic  literature,  and in fact  Mexico's  own experience,
argues  for  fast-paced  reforms. But  in this  case several  points  argue  for  a
more gradual  approach. First,  the  impact  of speed  of reform  on labor  markets
and  migration. As shown  in  figure  2, if  maize  prices  are liberalized
instantaneously,  around  700,000  workers  are  predictei  to  move almost  straight
away.  This implies  a migration  of  between  1  and 5  million  people  (average
family  size in rural  areas  is 7).  This  would  put  demands  on urban
infrastructure  and  labor  markets  that  would  be almost  impossible  to  meet.  A
more gradual  reform  leads  to the  same  migration,  but spreads  it  out  over  most
of the  coming  decade,  buying  time  to set  up the  infrastructure  and training
facilities  needed  to  accommodate  such  a large  group  of migrants.
DJ  The fiscal  costs  of intervention  do not fall  to zero  because  the  costs  of
the  tortivale  program  still  have to  be covered  (though  the tortivale  program
is  cheaper  because  of the  lower  producer  price  of maize).25
The second  problem  stems  from  the  pblitical  dimensions  of such  a large
reform  effort. A reform  that inflicts  substantial  losses  on particular  groups
in  society  may  be more  difficult  to implement,  even if the  majority  benefits.
In section  4 we argued  that  a program  focused  on improving  currently  rain-fed
land  by irrigation  and  other  productivity  enhancements  intervenes  at the  right
margin;  it  makes  subsistence  and  rain-fed  farmers  better  off  since  the  value
of their  land  holdings  recovers,  and also  benefits  landless  rural  workers
through  the labor  market  impact. But to fully  restore  land  values  to pre-
liberalization  levels  requires  at least  five  years,  because  of technical  and
engineering  constraints  on construction. Immediate  liberalization  of  maize,
even if  accompanied  by the  irrigation  program,  would  therefore  still  impose
substantial  transitory  losses:  cf Figure  10 for  the  case of rain-fed  farmers.
A gradual  phasing-out  of  maize
price  supports  mitigates  this
UtiAdltyn  Assisan-e &  Timing  problem,  although  a  relative  decline
4.2
4.15  (compared  to the  base  case)  is
t4.05  T  /  difficult  to  avoid  for  this  group.
But  note that  an absolute  drop  in
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Figure  10
A  final  argument  concerns
period-to-period  losses. The  rural  poor  have little  access  to capital  markets
to help them  smooth  consumption. Many live  in extreme  poverty,  and  may  have
higher  discount  rates  than  assumed  here, as survival  is  at stake. This
implies  that initial  losses,  even if the  net  change  in discounted  welfare  is26
positive  at the  discount  rate  used  here,  may  be particularly  costly. But if
the  adjustment  program  was suchi  that  at  no Roint  during  the  transition  utility
was less than  on the  reference  path,  the  reforms  would  not  hurt the  rural  poor
for  any  discount  rate.  The  government  can  then  argue  that  they are  being  made
better-off,  or at least  not losing  out,  without  asking  them  to wait five  years
before  benefits  materialize. Because  it is administratively  impossible  for
the  government  to reach  the  rural  poor  directly,  and  because  gradualism  may
avoid  initial  losses,  this too  calls  for  gradualism  as a second  best solution.
Simulation  6 explores  these  issues. We consider  the  same liberalization
of the  US market  for  fruits  &  vegetables  and the  same irrigation  program,  but
assume  that  the  liberalization  of maize  and tortilla  prices  is spread  over
six  years.  Further,  we assume  that  the  change  in maize  and tortilla  prices
begins  one-year  after  the irrigation  program  starts. This 'irrigation  first'
scenario  could  be interpreted  as a signal  from thu  government  to farmers  of
its  intentions  to help them  adjust  to free  trade  in  maize:  the  government
invests  in  productivity  improvements
before  any sacrifice  is  asked  for.
This  policy  insures  that  all  Utility  Subsistence Farmers (froction of bas  case)
1.02
households  see their  welfare  increase  1.01c 
vis-a  vis the  reference  path though  s°/ 
this  comes  at an efficiency  cost.  0.995
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smaller  than the  case  where  maize
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prices  move  pari-passu  with the
irrigation  program.27
The  pay-off  to this  efficiency
1.005-  Utility Rural Workers  cost  is  shown  in  Figure  11  and
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Figure  12
urban  workers  also  have higher
utility  at each  point  in time. Thus, if  price  reforms  and  adjustment  programs
are timed  carefully,  incorxoratine  maize into  the  FTA  can  strengthen  poverty
alleviation  efforts.
Consider  now  farmers  on rain-
fed  lands. Despite  the  timing  Utility Rain-fed  Farmers
4.22
changes  in the  irrigation  and  4.2
liberalization  program,  their  utility  4.10
is  still  less than  the  reference  case  4.12
for  three  years  (Figure  13). As  408  2  i  S  6  7  8  9
discussed,  the  CNA  program  tightens  T
the  rural  labor  market. And  while
Figure  13
higher  rural  wages improve  initial
utility  of subsistence  farmers  and  landless  workers,  they  also  raise  wage
costs  for  rain-fed  farmers. Thus,  because  the  government  can  only  help the
first  two  groups  via  higher  rural  wages,  it cannot  simultaneously  help rain-28
fed  farmers  in the initial  phase  of the  reforms. This  may call for  other
instruments  to  provide  transitory  support  to this group  (see  below).
Figure  14 shows  the  fiscal
FISCAL  COSTS  MAIZE  & [RR.  INTERVENTIONS
impact  of  these  timing  changes.  4.s  (Timing  Issues)
Initially  fiscal  expenditures  4
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interventions  to fall  below  those
under  protection,  table  1 shows  that in  present  value  terms  this  policy  is
still  cheaper  than  continuing  protection  forever. The fiscal  issue  associated
with the  adjustment  program  is  thus  not one  of overall  costs,  but one of
transitory  financing.
But to label  an issue  as 'transitory'  is  not to dismiss  it as
irrelevant. Fiscal  authorities  will  want to insure  that  if resources  are
commited  to irrigation  investments,  maize  prices  will indeed  be freed;  adding
the  costs  of irrigation  investments  to the  costs  of maize  policies  would  put
an undue  burden  on the  fiscal  accounts. At the  same  time,  policy  makers  in
charge  of agriculture  will  want to insure  that  if  maize  prices  are  freed,  the
resources  required  for irrigation  investments  will indeed  be there;
liberalizing  agriculture  in the  absence  of resources  for  adjustment  would  put
an undue  strain  on the  welfare  of large  numbers  of the  rural  population.  Thus
the  reform  process  needs  a 'commitment  technology'  to insure  that  its  two
components  -maize  liberalization  and  the irrigation  program-  are carried  out.29
Signing  maize  price  liberalization  as part  of the  FTA  solves  the  first
half of the  commitment  problem. But the  second  half still  needs  attention
because  there  are legal  impediments  to  multi-year  commitments  of fiscal
expenditures  in  Mexico. What guarantees  do the  rural  groups  potentially
affected  by maize liberalization  have that  the  irrigation  program  will  be
completed  once  the  FTA  negotiations  are  finished,  even  if the  government
'moves  first'  with its  irrigation  investment?  What is optimal  for  the
government  to  promise  now  may  well  not  be optimal  for  it to deliver  once  the
FTA  has  been signed.
The  need for  transitory  financing  for  the  adjustment  program  provides
part of the  solution. In particular,  a  multilateral  organization  could
provide  financing  during  the  adjustment  process  to the  FTA.  Since  the  overall
fiscal  gains  are  positive  in discounted  value  terms,  the  loan can  be paid  back
out  of the  savings  made later  in  time.  If such  financing  is  made contingent,
not on the  price  reforms  being  carried  out,  but  on the  irrigation  programs
promised,  it  would  become  expensive  to renege. The credibility  of the  program
is then increased  by increasing  the  costs  of failing  to follow  it through.
Recall  also  that  liberalization  reduces  the  value  of the  main collateral
owned  by subsistence  and  rain-fed  farmers. These  farmers  will  have better
access  to credit  only if commercial  banks  are  certain  that  the  land
improvements  that  will raise  the  value  of the  land  available  for  collateral
will indeed  incur. A program  of public  credit  guarantees  could  insure  farmers
access  to credit. But, equally  important  in  our context,  by committing  itself
through  credit  guarantees,  the  government  not  only signals  its  intent  to
implement  the  adjustment  program,  but also  makes  it  more costly  for  itself  to
not implement  it:  after  all,  not following  through  on the  irrigation  program30
would  reduce  the  value  of the  collateral  for  loans  that  carry  a  public
guarantee. Again,  increasing  the  expected  cost  of the  guarantee  scheme  makes
reneging  on promises  to implement  the  CNA  program  less  attractive.
6. Conclusions
Empirical  evidence  and  theoretical  analysis  overwhelmingly  support  the
view that  liberalizing  international  trade  leads  to efficiency  gains.  Recent
forays  in the  economics  of imperfect  competition  have created  some  question
marks  by bringing  in rent-shifting  and  second  best aspects,  but  have not led
to any strong  presumption  against  this  claim  (Krugman  and  Helpman (1989)).
This  paper fits  the  mold  by demonstrating  that  the  efficiency  gains  from
liberalizing  agricultural  trade  between  the  US and  Mexico  are  quite  large.
But if the  gains  are so large,  why has  agriculture  turned  out  to be so
hard to open  up?  Our analysis  raises  points  that  are likely  to feature  in  any
satisfactory  answer  to this  question. We show,  in  a realistic  analysis  of the
consequences  of including  agriculture  in the  currently-negotiated  FTA  between
Mexico  and the  US,  how efficiency  gains  fail  to filter  through  to important
groups  in society. In particular  we show  that in the  absence  of adjustment
measures  all  benefits  accrue  to the  richer  groups  in  both rural  and  urban
areas. These  effects  are  dramatically  brought  out  early  in the  reform  process
by being  capitalized  in land  values. This is surely  a factor  in the
resistance  by farmers  against  easing  protection  of agriculture.)M
Standard  trade  theory  counters  these  arguments  by pointing  out that
aggregate  efficiency  gains  imply  that  winners  can  compensate  losers  and still
16/  Krugman (1982)  also links  resistance  to trade  liberalization  to factor
price  effects.31
be better  off themselves. This  paper  starts  from the  premise  that instruments
to effect  such lump-sum  transfers  are  not available. Compensatinns  could  also
occur,  although  imperfectly,  through  indirect  taxes  and subsidies  (Dixit  and
Norman  (1980)),  but this  would  require  a degree  of differentiation  in the  tax
structure  that  would itself  trigger  substantial  administrative  and incentive
problems. In  more realistic  circumstances  specific  adjustment  programs  have
to  be designed  to accompany  a major  trade  reform.
Liberalizing  maize  in  Mexico  in the  context  of a permanent  change  like
the  FTA  creates  two  incentive  problems. First,  it clearly  hurts  maize
growers. But  compensating  farmers  pro  rata to their  maize  production  would
create  an incentive  to  continue  maize  production,  the  opposite  of  what the
reform  is  designed  to  achieve  to  begin  with.  Second,  liberalizing  maize  has a
substantial  impact  on rural  labor  markets  and  migration. Rural  employment
programs  could  be used to mitigate  large  labor  dislocations  and  transfer
income  to  workers. But such  a program  raises  a  key issue:  how to get  out  of
it as time goes  by.  If in current  circumstances  the  Government  feels
compelled  to assist,  those  affected  have every  incentive  not to  adjust  so as
not to lose the  transfers  by changing  the incentive  structure  the  Government
itself  faces  (Tornell  (1991)). Temporary  adjustment  programs  need  built  in
incentives  for  change.
We point  out that  to avoid  these  incentive  problems  adjustment  programs
should  focus  not on offsetting  the income  loss  associated  with  past
activities,  since  that  provides  an incentive  to continue  them;  instead  they
should  focus  on improving  the  productivity  of the  assets  owned  by the  groups
harmed  by the  reforms. This  solves  both incentive  problems;  by not linking
the  program  to  past activities,  there  is  no incentive  to continue  them;  and32
once  the  assets  of those  affected  are  more productive,  other  opportunities
will  be easier  to find,  reducing  pressure  on the  Government  to help  out.
This  paper  argues  the  need for  such  a program  in the  context  of opening
up Mexican  agriculture,  and  designs  one  along  the  lines  sketched  before..  In
the  specific  circumstances  of Mexican  agriculture,  this  translates  into
investments  that increase  the  productivity  of rain-fed  land  via irrigation  and
other  land improvements.  We find  that  a  program  that  transforms  about  8X of
the  total  stock  of rain-fed  land to irrigated  restores  the  value  of the  land-
holdings  of those  affected  by the  liberalization.  This  restores  the
collateral  value  of land,  and  thus  enhance  subsistence  and  rain-fed  farmers'
access  to  credit  precisely  at the  time  when credit  is  most needed. In
addition,  the  program  helps  owners  of labor  by generating  rural  employment
during  the  construction  period. More fundamentally,  it increases  the long
term  demand  for rural  labor  because  irrigated  land is substantially  more
labor-intensive  than rain-fed. Thus,  the  program  provides  workers  with
alternatives  once  it ends;  its  transitory  nature  is thus  credible.
Improving  the  value  of assets  people  own is like  an investment  program
and thus takes  time.  In contexts  where  capital  markets  are imperfect  those
affected  may not  be able  to borrow  against  the  value  of future  assets  to
smooth  consumption  overtime. This is particularly  important  if those  affected
are,  as in  Mexico's  case,  amongst  the  poorest  groups  in society. We therefore
argue  for  a gradual  pace  of reform.  We first  compute  the  efficiency  gains  of
trade  reforms  under  different  liberalization  speeds,  and find  that  gradualism
is not too  costly:  spreading  the  liberalization  over  a five  year period  lowers
the  present  discounted  value  of the  efficiency  gains  by only 5-6X.  We next
show  that  careful  timing  of both the  liberalization  and the  adjustment  program33
implies  that  the  rural  poor  have always  higher  utility  along  the  adjustment
path than  under  the  protection  path.
Embedding  trade  liberalization  in a Free  Trade  Agreements  is  a form  of
commitment  technology  to the  reform  process;  thus  arguments  for 'cold  turkey'
reforms  on the grounds  that  this is the  best form to  show commitment  to the
reforms  are  less  compelling  in  this  case.  But  there  is  a different  commitment
problem,  created  by the  time  delays  inherent  in  adjustment  programs. How  can
the  potential  beneficiaries  of adjustment  programs  be assured  that  those
programs  will  be implemented  once the  trade  liberalizations  have been
negotiated  in the  FTh? We argue  that  gradualism  also  contributes  to solve
this time-consistency  problem. Because  gradualism  gives  time  to implement  the
productivity-enhancing  programs,  the  beneficiaries  do not  have to give
anything  up before  the  benefits  start  coming  in.  Support  by external
organizations  contingent  on the  adjustment  programs  can  help in  solving  such
commitment  problems.
We hope the  principles  outlined  in this  paper  for  the  design  of
adjustment  programs  will contribute  to find  efficient  solutions  to.  similar
transitional  problems. The analysis  also suggests,  however,  that  application
of these  principles  requires  careful  analysis  of the  specifics  of each case,
and  of the  mechanisms  through  which  the  different  groups  are  affected.  There
may  be general  principles,  but there  are  unlikely  to  be rigid  rules  applicable
to each  and every  reform  program.
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I.  Model  Structure
I.1  Static  Relations
We begin  with the  static  relationships  of the  model  before  turning  to
the inter-temporal  aspects. For  ease of  notation  we omit  a time  sub-index  for
all  variables  (except  where  strictly  necessary).
Goods.  Factor  Endowments  and  Factor  Ownership
The economy  produces  seven  goods:  maize,  m; basic  grains,  g; vegetables,
v; other  agriculture,  o; livestock,  1; industry,  i;  and services,  s.  The
first  five  goods  are  produced  in the  rural  areas;  the last  two  in the  urban
areas. Goods  are  produced  by seven  factors  of production:  rural  labor,  LR,
urban  labor,  LU,  rain-fed  land,  TI, irrigated  land,  T2, livestock  land,  T3,
industry  capital,  KI,  and services  capital,  KS.  Z/
We distinguish  between  maize  and  tortillas,  but  model  tortilla
production  in a  very stylized  fashion. Tortillas  are  obtained  from  maize  via
a Leontief  transformation  that,  for simplicity,  requires  no primary  factors.
Tortillas  are  assumed  to  be non-traded,  with their  price  being  a function  only
of the  tax/subsidy-inclusive  producer  price  of  maize,  and  any  direct
government  taxes  or subsidies  to tortillas.
Factors  of production  are  owned  by six  types  of  households:  (i)  landless
rural  workers,  (ii)  subsistence  farmers,  who  each  own two  hectares  of rain-fed
land,  and  who allocate  their  labor  between  producing  on their  own land  and
participating  in the  rural  labor  marketZW,  (iii)  "rain-fed"  farmers,  who
own  the  remainder  of the  rain-fed  land  and  half of the  land  devoted  to
livestock  and, (iv)  "irrigated"  farmers,  who own  all  the irrigated  land,  and
the  other  half  of livestock  land.  For  both rain-fed  and irrigated  farmers,
land  ownership  is the  only  source  of income.
Urban  households  consist  of workers,  who own  all  urban  labor,  and
capitalists,  who own  the  capital  stock  in industry  and  services.  There  are  Hh
of each type  of households  (h  - 1,2,..,6). Ownership  shares  are given  by
matrix  X  - (m  u) where  mhj  is  household's  h share  of factor  of production  J.
j7/.We  separate  land  devoted  to livestock  from  land  devoted  to agriculture
because  Mexican  land tenure  regulations  preclude  the  use of agricultural  land
for  livestock  activities  (see  Heath (1990)).
18.i/  Data on the  distribution  of ownership  of land in  Mexico  are  scarce.
Various  studies  refer  to the  class  of 'subsistence  farmers',  who are  owners  of
such small  quantities  of land that  they  must also  participate  in the labor
market  (see  Masera (1990)  and  Salinas  (1990)). In this  paper  we define  a
'typical'  subsistence  farmer  as one  who owns  two  hectares  of rain-fed  land.
Of course,  in reality  there  is  a continuum  of ownership.2
Prices
World  prices  for  traded  goods,  pw1 21,  are  exogenous.  The  priceb  of
services,  the  non-traded  good,  is  ps.  The  vector  of commodity  goods  prices  is
p - [  pw J ps].  Modelling  trade  interventions  as combinations  of production
and  consumption  subsidies  and taxes  we write  producer  prices  as:
(I.1) pp - p.*(l  +  B)
where  s is.  the  vector  of producer  subsidies(+)/taxes(-),  and .*  denotes  an
element-by-element  multiplication.
Consumer  prices  differ  between  rural  and  urban  households,  so  we
introduce  separate  vectors  of consumer  taxes(+)  or subsidies(-),  ctr  and  ct',
for  rural  and  urban  areas,  respectively:
(1.2)  cpr  - p.*(l  +  ct')
(I.3)  cpU.-  p.*(l  +  ctu)
Urban  and  rural  tortilla  prices  may also  differl-0 1. Because  tortillas
are  only  produced  with maize,  their  price  is:
(I.4)  ptr  - amt*pp,*(l  - tsr)  - amt*pwV*(l  +  s,)*(l  - tsr)
(I.5)  ptu - amt.*pp,*(l  - tsu)  - at*pwm*(l  +  s8)*(l  - tsu)
where  amt  is  maize  input  per  unit  of tortillas,  and  tsr/tsu  are  rural/urban
tortilla  subsidies. Note that  as long  as tsr  (tsu)  is less  than s,,  rural
(urban)  tortilla  consumers  pay a net  tax,  despite  the fact  that  tortillas  are
'subsidized'.
Intermediate  input  prices  depend  on  production  location  (e.g.,  maize
sold  as input  into  livestock  in rural  areas  vs.  maize  sold  as input  into
industry  in  urban  areas). Vectors  itz  and itu  contain  ad  valorem
taxes/subsidies  on intermediate  inputs  for  rural  and  urban  areas  respectively.
Thus the  vectors  ipr  and ipu  of intermediate  prices  to  producers  in  rural  and
urban  areas,  respectively,  are  in general  different.
Finally,  we denote  by wX and  wu  the  rural  and  urban  wage rates,  and  by rl
and  r2 the  rental  rates  on rain-fed  and  irrigated  lands,  respectively.AW
I/  All  price  vectors  are  defined  as row  vectors,  and  a'l  quantity  vectors  as
column  vectors. All  vectors  are in  bold.
IQ/ The  government  attempts  to stop  arbitrage  on ,maize  and  tortillas  via
controls  on maize  distribution  to tortilla  mills  and to other  users  of maize.
21/  In  what follows  the labels  1/2  on any  variable  refer  to the  rain-
fed/irrigated  distinction.3
Intermediate  inputs  are  used  in  in  fixed  proportions;  primary  inputs
produce  value  added.  Except  for  Hicks-neutral  technical  change,  technology  is
constant  through  time.  Matrix  A  contains  intermediate  input/output
coefficients,  with most elements  exogenously  given. However,  we do allow
substitution  between  maize  and  basic  grains  (mainly  sorghum)  as inputs  into
livestock. With a CES  structure,  the  cost-minimizing  I/0 coefficients  of
maize  and  basic  grains  into  livestock,  am,  and  a.,,  are:W
(I.6)  am, - (pa*/ipr)A.  e
(I.7)  a.,  - (l-r)0.(pa*/ipt 5 )M.a`
Land  Use
Land  allocated  to any  given  crop is  subject  to diminishing  returns. To
capture  this,  we make  a difference  between  effective  land, T,  and  Y..Ysical
land,  T.  The latter  refers  to the  actual  hectares  allocated  to a crop;  the
former  to the  amount  of land  that  is  usable  for  producing  that  crop.  The
relationship  between  them  is given  by:
(I.8)  -r.T  r>O  ;  O  < <  1,
so  that  as  more  (rain-fed  or irrigated)  physical  land  is applied  to a crop,
the  amount  of  effective  land  grows  less  than  proportionately.  This  captures
incentives  for crop  rotation  and other  agricultural  practices  that  result  in
crop  diversification.  Irrigated  land  is assumed  to  be better  than  rain-fed  in
the following  way: *l  S  02,  i.e.,  as more irrigated  land is  allocated  to a
given  crop,  diminishing  returns  obtain  more slowly  than in  rain-fed  lands.
Hence,  for  the same  price  change  the  supply  response  in irrigated  lands  is
stronger. As a result  of  yield  differences,  infra-marginal  rents  accrue  to
owners  of irrigated  land  in standard  Ricardian  fashion.
Value  Added
Production  functions  are  Cobb-Douglas  with constant  returns  to scale  to
labor  and  capital  in the  urban  goods,  and  to labor  and effective  land  in the
22/  Let  a*  be  the  exogenously  given  fixed  quantity  of feed  per unit of
livestock,  given  by:
a*  - fr.amA?-l/"  +  (l-r).a, 5 1 Jl/J/C  A)  , >  0,  p  f  1,  r f  (0,1)
Given  intermediate  input  prices  an exact  price  index  for  a*  is:
pa  - Cr.  iprmla  +  (l-r  a
Substituting  pa*  in  (1.6)  and  (I.7)  gives  matrix  A(p).4
rural  goods.  For  example,  value  added  on  maize  cultivated  in rain-fed  lands
is:
(l-a1o)  ala  (lOalm)  cd,  Xl.al,
( 1-  al.)  Ala
- pl,.  RlR  .Tl,
where  LRl,,  Tl,  are  rural  labor  and rain-fed  lands  allocated  to  maize
production,  pl,  - rlm,ll  and  Al,  - olm.alm.  Note  that 0  <  Alm  <  al,  <  1,
implying  that (I.9)  exhibits  decreasing  returns  to scale  between  rural  labor
and  physical  land. As a result,  although  the  number  of agricultural  goods
exceeds  the  number  of rural  factors  of production,  there  need  not  be full
specialization.
Technical  Change
Technical  change  is  assumed  to  be Hicks-neutral  in all sectors. A time-
dependent  constant  pre-multiplies  the  Cobb-Douglas  value  added  function  in all
sectors. The rate  of technical  change  in rain-fed  land  (equal  to the  rate  of
technical  change  in livestock)  is less  than  in irrigated  land. Rates  of
technical  change  in industry  and services  are assumed  to  be equal.
Goods  Supply
Output  vectors  in  rain-fed  and irrigated  lands  are  ql and  .q2,
respectively. Output  of livestock  is  denoted  q3,  while  the  output  vector  in
the  urban  sector  is qu.  Hence,  the  vector  of gross  supplies  is:  qs - t (ql  +
q2) I  q3 I  qu 1.  All sectors  are  perfectly  competitive. Let  pn be the
vector  of 'net'  or value  added  prices,  obtained  by substracting  from-producer
prices  intermediate  input  costs. The  derived  demands  for  labor  and land  in
agricultural  production  are (again  using  maize  in raia-fed  lands  as example):
1-alm  alm  (alm-i)  -alm  l/(alm-Alm)
Tl,  - ((l-alm)  .Pl,.pn-Al,  wr  .rl  )
(I.10)
(l  Al')  (A0-alm)  -Al,  1-Aim  xlm  -1  l/(Ala-alm)
LRlm  - ((l-alm)  Alm.  wr  .rl  (plM.pnM) )
Similar  equations  follow  for  other  crops. In industry  and  services  capital  is
sector-specific,  as is land  in livestock,  so that  only  demands  for  rural  labor
in livestock,  LR3,  and for  urban  labor  in industry,  LUI,  and  services,  LU 8,
are  derived. Goods  supply  follow  from  substituting  optimal  factor  demands
into  the  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions.5
Household  Incomes.  Consumtion  and  Savings
Production  generates  factor  incomes:  .ural  and  urban  wages,  rents  to
rain-fed,  irrigated  and livestock  land,  and  quasi-rents  to capital  in industry
and  services.  N, the  matrix  of ownership  shares,  maps factor  incomes  facinc
into  household  incomes.
In  addition,  households  receive  government  transfers  through  the
'tortivales'  program,  with a  market  value  of vt.  But  since  urban  and  rural
tortilla  prices  differ,  the  market  value  of a given  quantity  of freely
distributed  tortillas  to  households  of type  h, QTh,  depends  on  households'
location. Thus,  for  example,  for  urban  workers  (the  fifth  household  group)  we
have:
(I.11)  vt5 - ptu*QT 5
The fiscal  cost  of the 'tortivale'  program,  CT, is  given  by:
6  6
(I.12)  CT - E  at*pp  QTh  > Z  vtb
h-l  h-1
since  the  government  has to  purchase  maize from  producers  at prices  ppm  to
make tortillas  for  the  tortivales. But  because  tortillas  are  subsidized,  the
value  of the  transfer  to  households  is  less than  the  fiscal  cost  of the
transfer  to the  government. The difference  is  an 'implicit'  subsidy  to  maize
producers.
Collecting  terms (and  ignoring  household's  income  taxes)  we obtain  Y,
households'  disposable  income:
(I.13)  Y - M*facinc  + vt
Households  save  a -onstant  proportion  of their  disposable  income,  qh, so
that  savings  for  each  household  are:
(I.14)  Sh  - h-yh
(Yb  - Sh)  are  consumption  expenditures  for  households  of type  h.  We
assume  a nested  Cobb-Douglas/CES/CES  utility  function. The outer  Cobb-Douglas
nest allocates  expenditures  between  three  goods:  industry,  services  and  a
composite  agricultural  good.  The  next  CES  nest aggregates  the  five  rural
goods  into  a composite  rural  good.  Finally,  the  last  CES  nest distributes
maize  consumption  between  raw  maize  and tortillas.A  Solving  the  utility
2_/  Urban inhabitants  consume  maize  mostly  in the  form  of tortillas. In the
rural  areas  the  government  purchase.s  maize  from  producers  at the  price  PPm,
but sells  maize  flour  to  consumers  at the  price  ptr  because  there  are fewer
tortilla  distribution  outlets  in rural  areas.  (This  is  why the 'tortivale'
program  does  not  operate  in  rural  areas.) Our  model ignores  the  opportunity
cost  of time to rural  households  of making  tortillas  from  maize  flour,  but
allows  for  maize to  be consumed  either  as raw  maize  or as tortillas.6
maximization  problem  £or  each  househola  we obtain  consumption  demands  for
tortillas,  maize,  the remaining  agricultural  goods,  as well as livestock,
industry  and services. Demand  for  tortillas  is then  translated  into  maize
demand  given  the  input/output  coefficient  at.  This gives  us the  vector  of
total  household  consumption,  c.
Given  the  homotheticity  of preferences  we can  construct  an exact  price
index  for  each  household,  CPIh,.  that  depends  on the  location  of the  household
(given  differences  in rural,  cpl,  and  urban,  cpu,  consumer  prices),  as  well as
on the  particular  parameters  of its  utility  function. Given  these  indices,  we
compute  an index  of the  real  consumption  wage to rural  and  urban  workers,  a'
and Q", respectively,  as:
(I.15a) jr  - wV/CPI2  (I.15b)  Du  - w'/CPI 5
where  we use the  preferences  of landless  rural  workers  and  urban  workers
(household  groups  2 and  5,  respectively)  for  computing  the  relebant  CPIs.
Investment  and  Total  Demand
Private  investment  only takes  place  in industry  and  services. We take
the rate  of growth  of the  capital  stock  in industry  and  services  in  period  t,
gkt,  as exogenous. Let invprop  be the  vector  of goods  required  to  produce  one
unit of capital,  and  assume  that  capital  produced  for  industry  and  services
has the  same composition. The  vector  of private  investment  demands,  z, is
then  given  by:
(I.16)  Zt  - (gkt+gdt).(KIt  + KSt).invprop
where  gdt  is the  depreciation  rate.  Then total  value  of private  investment  is:
(1.17)  It  - Pt.Zt
We only consider  public  investment  in irrigation  infrastructure.  Let  RIt
be the  number  of  hectares  of rain-fed  land  that is transformed  to irrigated  in
period  t.  Irrigation  construction  is assumed  to require  rural  labor  and
intermediate  inputs,  given  at the  unit level  by vector  inputirr  for  goods,  and
by lrirr  for labor. The real  resource  costs  of irrigation  are  assume  to  be an
increasing  function  of the  stock  of irrigated  land,  reflecting  the  fact that
as these  investments  increase  lands  of poorer-quality  are encountered  (greater
distance  from  water  resources,  steeper  lands,  etc.).  We write:
t-l  y
(I.18)  Qt  - q.(E T2t  /T2 0)  ;  q >  0,  y  > 1
t-0
where  Qt  is an index  of  marginal  costs  applied  to inputirr  and lrirr,  and  T2 0
is the initial  stock  of irrigated  land.  Hence,  the total  demand  for  goods
and labor  required  for irrigation  investments  is:7
(I.19a)  gt  - Qt.RIt.inputirr
(I.19b)  LRIRRt  - Qt.RIt.lrirr
Ignoring  other  components  of government  expenditures,  the  vector  of
total  goods'  demand  is:
(1.20)  qd - A*qs  +  c  +  z  +  g
Migratin
Let  Hb be the  total  number  of  households  of type  h.  Consumption
quantities  are  divided  by the  total  number  of  households  of each  type to
obtain  per-capita  consumptions. Substituting  per-capita  consumptions  into  the
utility  function  gives  per-household  utility  for  each  type of  household,  Uh.
Utility  functions  are identical,  but  parameters  differ  between  urban
workers,  landless  rural  workers  and  subsistence  farmers,  on the  one  hand,  and
rain-fed  and irrigated  land-owners  and  urban  capitalists,  on the  other. The
first  group  allocates  a larger  share  of expenditure  to rural  goods  compared  to
the  second. Thus,  changes  in  maize  and  tortilla  prices  have a larger  impact
on the  first  group. All members  of the  potential  migrant  population  have the
same  utility  function,  so  we can  compare  per-capita  workers'  utilities  across
locations.
Migration  incentives  result  from  rural-urban  differences  in  consumption
wages,  Ox  and Du, and from  differences  in  benefits  derived  from  living  in  a
given  area (like  the  urban 'tortivale'  program). Letting  LN be the  stock  of
migrants  that  move from the  rural  to the  urban  areas,  Ur  and  Uu the (per
capita)  utility  of a worker  in the  rural  and  urban  areas,  respectively,  and
the  superscript  0 an initial  equilibrium,  we write:
(1.21)  Lu - k((U, 0 /U, 0)/(Uu/Ux)]"  - k  ; k >  0,  Xj 2 0
where  k is  a constant  and  n the  elasticity  of  migration  to  urban-rural  utility
differentials. Note that  q  - 0 completely  segments  the  urban  and  rural  labor
markets.
Excess  Demands
At each  period  of time  total  demands  for  land  and  labor  are:
(I.22a)  TlD(rl)  - E  Tl1
(I.22b)  T2D(r2)  - E  T2j  for  j  - m,g,v,o.
(I.22c)  LRD(wr)  - E  LRl  +  E  LR2j  +  LR3  +  LRIRR
(I.22d)  LUD(wu) - LUi  +  LU 8
Note  from  (I.22c)  that  rural  labor  demand  includes  the  workers  employed  in
constructing  irrigation.8
Given  taxes  and  subsidies  domestic  prices  for tradeable  goods  follow
from  world  prices,  with net  exports  bringing  tradeables  supply  and  demand  into
balance. The  same is  not true  of services. This  market,  jointly  with the
markets  for  rural  and  urban labor,  and rain-fed  and  irrigated  land,  is  cleared
by prices. Our  model  thus  determines  factor  prices  and  the real  exchange
rate.8&/  Let  P contain  these  prices,  i.e.,  P - [  wr I wu  rl I  r2  ps].
Excess  demand  functions  to determine  P are:
(I.  23a)  LRD(P)  + Lr(P) - LRO  - 0
(I.23b)  LUD(P)  - L'u  (P)  - LUO  - 0
(I.23c) TlD(P) - Tl - 0
(I.23d) T2D(P) - T2 - 0
(I.23e) qs,(P)  - qd 8(P)  - 0
By construction,  at the  initial  values  for the  exogenous  variables  L  - 0.
Given  the  value  at time  t for  production  and consumption  taxes  and
subsidies,  a solution  to (I.23)  provides  allocations  of rain-fed  and irrigated
land to each  crop,  a division  of the total  labor  force  between  urban  and  rural
areas  as well as its  allocation  across  goods,  factor  prices  and the  real
exchange  rate,  and  a utility  level  for  each  household.
1.2  oral  RelationshiRs
Accumulation  Equations
At each  period  of time  the  economy  is described  by the  solution  to
(I.23). But from  one  period  to the  next the  economy  changes  as a result  of
exogenous  and  policy-induced  changes. The  exogenous  changes  are: (i)  growth
of labor  and  populacionX 5/, (ii)  Hicks-neutral  technical  change  in urban  and
rural  sectors,  (iii)  growth  of the  capital  stock  in industry  and
services>i/,  (iv)  government  spending  in non-agriculture  items,  and (v)  the
path of world  prices. Policy-induced  changes  center  on the  path of taxes  and
subsidies,  irrigation  investments  and government  transfer  policies.
2A/  Recall  that  capital  in industry  and  services  (as  well as land  in
livestock)  are fixed. Thus,  these  factors  just earn  quasi-rents.
5/  To reflect  Mexico's  demographic  transition  the  rate  of growth  of labor,
3X,  is set  higher  than  the  rate  of growth  of  population,  2%.  During  the
transition  period,  see  below,  the  rate  of growth  of labor  slowly  declines
until  in the  steady-state  it  equals  that  of  population. Thus,  households  who
own  labor  initially  grow faster  than  households  who own  only  land  or capital.
W/ In a fuller  model  of the impact  of the  FTA  investment  rates  in industry
and  services  would  clearly  be endogenous. Here,  however,  we are interested  in
the  effects  of changes  in agricultural  liberalization  only.9
The endowments  of land  evolve  if there  are  irrigation  programs
transforming  rain-fed  land  into irrigated  land:
(I.24a)  Tlt  - Tlt-l  - RIt 1 ;  (I.24b)  T2t  - T2t  + RIt-l
Note  that  we  assume  a  one-period  gestation  lag.  All  owners  of  rain-fed  land
(subsistence  peasants  and  rain-fed  farmers)  are  assumed  to  benefit  from
irrigation  investments  in  proportion  to the initial  share  of rain-fed  land
held by each group. The  matrix  of ownership  shares,  Mt,  is therefore  up-dated
at each  period  to reflect  the  fact  that  when irrigation  investments  take  place
the  increase  in the  endowments  of irrigated  land  belongs  to subsistence
farmers  and rain-fed  farmers.
The  number  of households  of each  type  also  changes  through  time.
Landless  rural  workers,  subsistence  farmers  and  urban  workers  grow at the  rate
of growth  of the  labor  force,  glt,  so that the  urban  and  rural  allocation  of
labor  evolves  according  to:
(I.25a) LRt  - (IRt,-  - Lt- 1)(1  +  glt-.)
(I.25b)  LUt  - (LUt  1 + Lrut.1)(l  + glt  l)
On the  other  hand,  the  number  of rain-fed  farmers,  irrigated  farmers  and  urban
capitalists  grows  according  to:
(1.26)  Ht  - Ht_ 1(l + gpt-1)
where  gpt  is the  growth  rate  of  population  in  period  t.
Finally,  the  capital  stock  in industry  and  services  evolves  according
to:
(I.27a)  KIt  - KIt- 1 .(l+gkt- 1);  (I.27b)  KSt  - KSt- 1.(l+gkt 1)
The  Transition  Path and  the  Steady-State
We take  as starting  point  for  our analysis  a particular  date (to-l  for
convenience),  and  divide  the  future  into  a transition  path  and a steady-state.
The transition  path lasts  (at  most)  T-1  > to  years;  the  steady-state  obtains
in  all  periods  from  T onwards. All policy  changes  occur  during  the transition
period. By assumption,  static  and intertemporal  relative  prices  remain
unchanged  over  the interval  [T,-). This  allows.  us to Hicks-aggregate  all  of
the  steady-state  path  of the  economy. It then  suffices  to simply  calculate
period  T values,  since  all future  periods  will  be identical  up to a uniform
scalefactor  (growth  rate)  for  all  quantities. The aggregation  process
therefore  only  affects  the  discount  factors,  which is  much larger  for  the  T
period  to account  for the  fact  that  this 'period'  is replicated  (again,  up to
a uniform  scale  factor  for  all quantities)  an infinite  number  of years.
If  we label  the  common  and  constant  post-T  growth  rate g, and  the  real
interest  rate rw,  this  process  works  as follows.  Define  6-l/(l+r*),  and
65-(l+g)/(l+rw),  where  6.  is the  period-to-period  growth  adjusted  discount
factor. Then the  following  expressions  obtain  for the  back-to-period-1
discount  factors  6(i):10
,8(j)  . 6f-1  for  i  <  T
- E7 81 for  I2T  (I.28)
17-1
Consider  now the  Net Present  Value,  NPVy,  of (yt),  where  yt-yt- 1 (l+g)  for  all
t  > T:
NPVy  '  Yt.  . . g
= E;71  y".  at.-4  +  y7 8T7 (1.29)
£,  Yt.6'-l  + 87-1 yr  e-r  (I.29)
ar
Thus the infinite  horizon  modeled  can  be captured  by calculating  period  T only
(out  of all [T,c)  periods),  but  adjusting  the  period  T discount  factor  to
equal:
8  (T)  = .r-l  (I.30)
Intertemporal  Budget  Constraints
With the  exception  of  urban  capitalists,  we assume  that  private
households  do not  save  or invest. Thus, in  each  period  their  consumption
equals  their  income.  Thus,  since  they  satisfy  their  period-by-period  budget
constraint,  they  will automatically  satisfy  their  inter-temporal  budget
constraint.
Private  investment  by urban  capitalists  is  given  by (I.27),  and  private
savings,  all  done  by urban  capitalists,  by (I.14).  Their  savings  rate,  (,pis
assumed  to  be exogenously  given  during  the  transition  period. Thus,  urban
capitalists  are assumed  to have  access  to the  world  capital  market,  where they
can lend  or  borrow  as required  at the  world  real  interest  rate rw. However,
this  convention  cannot  be maintained  in the  steady  state.  If the  savings  rate
would  mechanically  be extended  through  the  steady  state  period,  there  would  be
no guarantee  that  urban  capitalists  would  remain  within  their  budget
constraint,  or,  alternatively,  exhaust  all  resources  available  to them.  In
both cases,  welfare  comparisons  accross  different  simulation  experiments  would
be illegitimate,  since  their  opportunity  set  would  in effect  be varied
arbitrarily.
To solve  this  problem  we endogenise  the  period  T savings  rate in such  a
way that,  if  maintained  over the  interval  [T,co),  urban  capitalists  will
exactly  satisfy  their  intertemporal  budget  constraint. This  means that  over
the interval  [1,00),  the  discounted  value  of their  consumption  expenditure
equals  the  discounted  value  of their  after-tax  income  net  of investment11
expenditure. In particular,  if during  the  transition  period  urban  capitalists
accumulated  debt,  the  steady-state  savings  rate is increased  so that the
discounted  value  at time  T of future  savings  over investment  equals  the
current  value  of the  debt accumulated  up through  period  T-1.  The  converse
holds if during  the transition  period  urban  capitalists  accumulated  assets..
Formally  this  can  be represented  as follows. Define  after-tax  savings  net  of
private  investment,  all in  period  i, as  xi  and income  net  of taxes  and
investment  expenditure  as yi. Then NPV,(T)  equals:
MV  ( 1)  U  + g)  CTr
(I.31)
xF
Define  debt accumulated  through  period  T-1 as DT- 1. To satisfy  the
intertemporal  budget  constraint,  XT needs  to satisfy:





To make  welfare  comparisons  accross  experiments  it is  not enough  just to
make sure that  all  groups  satisfy  their  intertemporal  budget  constraints. In
many  cases,  the  time  paths  of period-by-period  utility  of a particular
household  accross  two  simulations  will cross,  making  period-by-period
comparisons  difficult. The solution  is to  calculate  net discounted  utility,
or welfare,  using  the  rate  of time  preference  to discount  future  welfare  back
to today. That  procedure  presents  no problems  for the  interval  [l,T-l].
However  one  cannot  simply  copy the  procedure  followed  for  NPV  measures  in
equation  (9), (13)  for  the interval  [T,-). The reason  is,  that  per-household
consumption  grows  at the  rate  gc27/,  but  because  of declining  marginal
utility,  per-household  utility  Uh  will grow  at a lower  rate than  gc.  Since  we
use a constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA)  utility  function  to aggregate
utility  over  time,  the  following  relation  between  the  two growth  rates  holds:
27/Note  that  gc  <  g because  it is a per-household  measure.  If gp is the rate
of population  growth,  g, gc and  gp are linked  as follows:
(l+g)  - (l+gc).(l+gp)
6 12
&b  (  la)  (I.  33)
where a is the intertemporal  s4bstitution  elasticity,  and  a  hat over  a
variable  denotes  the  rate  of growth. This leads  to the  following  expression
for  welfare,  Wh,  the  net discounted  utility  for  household  h:
W ;Uh(Cc)
Wh EZ(I+p)t
t  Uh (U  (  t)  prof
+ U),  CT)  r  (  t+  a  lgo)e
(  +p)7  rr  (j+p  t-T  (I.34)
=  zz1  Ub~(C)  ,  et  +  Uh  cr)  )  8kre,
Uh  Cd  - &'Ptrp:efA
where 
5pre.  f  1  and  )reA  +p
II.  Data Sources
We constructed  a Social  Accounting  Matrix  (SAM)  for  1989,  the last  year
for  which information  was available  for  all  the  variables  required  for the
model.
Our departure  point  was data  provided  by the  Ministry  of  Agriculture
(SARH)  on  value  of gross  output,  physical  output  and  areas  harvested  (and  thus
yields)  in rain-fed  and  irrigated  lands  in 1989  for  26 individual  agricultural
products. These  products  account  for  68.3X  of the  value  of output  in
agriculture  in that  year;  unfortunately,  no information  was individually
available  for the  other  rtoducts  that  account  for  the  remaining  31.7X  of
output,  though  we do  have the  totals  for  all  the  variables  concerned. Table
II.1  lists  the  products  for  which  information  was available  and  maps them into
the four  agricultural  sectors  included  in our  model.  We interpret  the
physical  totals  (in  hectares)  of harvested  rain-fed  and irrigated  lands  in
1989  as the  endowments  of these  two  factors  of production. SARH also  provided
us  with value  of output  in livestock  industry,  as  well as with  cost data  to
divide,  at the  level  of each  of the  five  rural  sectors,  the  value  of total
gross  supply  into:  wages,  aggregate  rents  (but  not its  division  between  rain-
fed  and irrigated  lands),  and  a seven  sector  disaggregation  of intermediate
input  costs.  W
From the  Sistema  de Cuentas  Nacionales  de  Mexico  we obtain  the  1989
totals  for  all the  macroeconomic  aggregates:  national  income,  private
IV  Unfortunately,  these  data  did  not  permit  disaggregation  of intermediate
input  costs  between  rain-fed  and irrigated  lands,  forcing  us to assume  the
same input  structure  in each  case.13
investment,  private  consumption,  direct  taxes  (on  households  and factors),
indirect  taxes,  total  government  spe.  rung,  private  savings,  the trade  balance,
as well  as gross  value  of demand  and  xNlue  added  in industry  and services.
Data  from  Cuentas  Nacionales  was then  combined  with data from  Banco  de  Mexico.
This allowed  us to  disaggregate  the  trade  balance  (at  world  prices)  into  the
seven  sector  aggregation  used in  our  model.  Substracting  sectoral  net  exports
from  sectoral  gross  demands  gave  us sectoral  domestic  demand,  which  we
proceeded  to divide  between  private  consumption,  private  investment  and
government  demand  using  information  from  the  1985  I/O  table,  but insuring  that
the  totals  coincided  with the  1989  National  Accounts  totals. With the
information  just  described  we pieced  together  a consistent  Social  Accounting
Matrix  (SAM)  for  1989.
Table A.1:  AGRICULTURAL  OUTPUT,  1989
Sector/product  GVS  Rain-fed  GVS  Irrigated  GVS  Totall
I  Maize  3,610  1,180  4,790
It  Basic  Grains  1,437  3,711  5,149
1.Rice  175  186  362
2.Wheat  119  1,585  1,704
3.Sorghum  805  904  1,710
4.Barley  155  41  196
5.Soy-8eans  89  885  974
6.Cartamo  57  89  146
7.Sesame  Seed  35  19  54
III  Key  Products  2,363  1,609  3,972
1.Beans  455  292  748
2.Cotton  59  124  184
3.Sugar  Cane  1,396  1,071  2,667
4.Coffee  264  0  264
5.Tabbaco  0  121  121
6.Cacao  149  0  149
T.Heneguen  37  0  37
IV  Fruits.  Ves.
And Rest  7,089  9,626  16,715
1.Chile  98  515  613
2.Strawberries  0  68  68
3.Sunflower  0.7  0.7  1.4
4.Tomatoes  0.1  1,393  1,502
5.Avocadoes  151  194  345
6.Alfalfa  12  2,251  2,263
7.Copra  131  59  190
8.Lemon  159  478  637
9.Apples  30  322  403
10.Oranges  343  147  490
11.Bananas  332  156  488
12.Rest  5.671  4,040  9,711
Millions  of  1989  pesos;  totals  may  not  match  due  to  rounding  errors;  GVS  =  gross  value  of  supply.
Source:  Direccion  General  de  Estadistica,  SARH.
The Sistema  de Cuentas  Nacionales  also  had data on the  totals  of
employment  in agriculture  (including  livestock),  industry  and  services. We
interpret  total  agricultural  employment  as the  initial  rural  labor  force,  and14
total  services  and industry  employment  as the  initial  urban  labor  force.
Employment  figures  are  measured  as number  of  workers. Data on the  division  of
employment  among  the  various  crops  (in  each type  of land)  was unavailable;  to
remedy  this  situation  we proceed  in three  steps.  First,  we use  technological
information  contained  in  Norton  and  Solis  (1983)  to construct  approximate
labor/land  ratios  in rain-fed  and irrigated  lands  for  our  model's  crop
aggregation. Second,  we use the  SARH  1989  data  on rain-fed  and  irrigated  land
allocated  to each  crop  to calculate  the  employment  'implied'  by th-  observed
land  allocation. Third,  because  the  total  agricultural  employment  implied  by
these  calculations  fell  short  of the  total  employment  registered  in the
National  Accounts  (by  a factor  of 27%),  we augmented  all  labor/land  ratios  so
that the  calculated  employment  in fact  matched  the  observed  1989  total. Note
that  since  all labor/land  ratios  were augmented  by the  same factor,  relative
labor  intensities  are  equal  to those  implied  in  Norton  and  Solis  (1983).
Our  model  requires  information  on the  parameters  for  the 'land
transformation  functions'  [T1  ,  *1] and (T2 ,  02].  Given  our  production
technology  the  price  elasticity  of supply  for  any  crop (in  any given  type  of
land)  is:
(II.1)  es  - 1/(a  - 00)
Given  the shares  of land  in  velue  addedMV,  a, we selected  values  for  0  in
each  type  of land  such  that the  aggregate  supply  elasticity  (a  production-
weighted  average  of the supply  elasticity  in  rain-fed  and  irrigated  lands)
matched,  for the  case of maize,  estimated  elasticities  (see  Levy and  Van
Winjbergen,  1991a). Lack  of previously  estimated  elasticities  made this
procedure  impractical  for  other  crops.  In these  cases  given  the  values  for  a
we simply  choose  values  for  0  such that:  (i) l s 42 and, (ii)  the  associated
division  of output  between  rain-fed  and irrigated  lands  matched  the  SARH  data.
To obtain  parameters  for  the  utility  functions  we used the  1984  Income-
Expenditure  Survey  (IES)  to compute  expenditure  shares  for  rural  and  urban
households  for  each  income  decile. Unfortunately,  however,  our  model's
aggregation  pattern  was difficult  to  match  with the IES  expenditure
classification. In particular,  expenditures  on food  are  not equal  to
expenditures  on our composite  rural  good,  since  part of the  output  of rural
goods  is sold  as input  to industry,  which  in turn  produces  food (e.g.,  wheat
into  bread). To remedy  this  situation  it  would  be necessary  to dis-aggregate
the industry  sector  into  a food  producing  sector  . a 'rest  of industry'
sector. Unfortunately,  there  was no 1989  data to carry  this  out.  Hence,  we
arbitrarily  re-allocated  the  IES  expenditure  shares  between  the  composite
rural  good,  industry  and services. Such  re-allocation  insured  that:  first,
the  households  that  could  potentially  migrate  (subsistence  farmers,  landless
rural  workers  and  urban  workers)  all  had the  same  expenditure  shares  and
2j/  As mentioned  earlier,  the  SARH  data  did  not  divide  total  rents  to land
between  rain-fed  and irrigated. We carried  out  this  division  assuming  that
the  share  of rents  accruing  to rain-fed  land  was, in  each crop,  equal  to the
share  of gross  value  of rain-fed  output  in total  output.15
substitution  elasticities. Second,  all  non-migrant  households  had equal
shares  and  elasticities.  Third,  the  aggregate  consumption  of each  good
resulting  from  the  different  household  preferences  and incomes  matched  the
sectoral  consumption  totals  registered  in the  SAM.
We turn  to the tax  and  subsidy  information. Elsewhere  (Levy  and  Van
Wijnbergen,  1991a)  we calculated  the  implied  urban  and rural  prices  of maize
for  1989  given  that  year's  policy  configuration.  In addition,  with the  SARH
and  Banco  de Mexico  data  mentioned  above,  we calculated  the  production-
weighted  tariff  for  basic  grains,  the  other  sector  of agriculture  with
significant  protection  in 1989.  For industry,  on the  other  hand,  we assume  an
average  tariff  rate  of 5X.  VAT rates  for  industry  and services,  as well as
direct  tax rates  on factors  and  households  were derived  from  our  constructed
SAM.  For  simplicity,  we assumed  that  only  urban  capitalists  pay  direct  income
taxes.
Next,  we discuss  sources  of data  for  the irrigation  program. We
obtained  the  complete  portfolio  of existing  investment  projects  from  the
Comision  Nacional  del  Agua (CNA)  for  both development  of  new irrigation
districts  and re-habilitation  of existing  ones. The data included  average
costs,  internal  rate  of return  and labor  requirements  per  hectare  renovated
and/or  irrigated  for  each  project. All  projects  with an internal  rate of
return  of 8% or more  were ranked  in  order  of increasing  per-unit  cost  of
renovated/irrigated  hectares. For this  sub-set  of projects  we computed
average  labor  requirements  for  irrigation,  and obtained  an estimate  for lrirr
in (I.19b). We also ran  a simple  OLS  regression  for  relation  (I.18)  to  obtain
estimates  of y.  The regression  took  the  form:
n
(1I.2)  ln Ci  - ln q +  y ln Z  RI  +  ci
i-1
where  Ci  is the  average  cost  of renovating  and/or  irrigating  RI 1 hectares  with
project  i, and  n is  the total  number  of projects  (ordered  by increasing  C1).
The  regression  had a  very good  fit,  with (corrected)  R2 of 0.8630,  and  an
estimated  value  for y of 2.2118  (with  a t-statistic  of 36.895).
Finally,  we assumed  the  following  values  for  the  other  key  parameters:
(i)  rate  of time  preference,  72; (ii)  the inter-temporal  elasticity  of
substitution,  2; (iii)  the  world  rate  of interest,  7%; (iv)  the  rate  of growth
population,  2%.  In addition,  we assume  that initial  rate  of growth  of the
labor  force  is 3%,  and that  it linearly  converges  to the  rate  of growth  of
population,  2%,  over  a 10-year  period. Lastly,  we assume  that  the  capital
stock  inr  industry  and  services  and  non-irrigation  real  government  expenditures
all  grow  at 4%.16
III.  Model  Calibration
Calibration  for 1989
We combine  the  various  sources  of information  described  above  to compute
an initial  solution  to the  excess  demand  equations. The initial  solution  only
computes  a one-period  equilibrium. For  convenience  we set  world  prices,  pw,
equal  to  unity,  and  choose  units  such  that in  the initial  solution  p - [pw I
ps ]  is the  unit  vector. The  numeraire  is  a bundle  of domestic  goods  with the
composition  observed  in 1989.  By construction  the  real exchange  rate is  unity
in the  base solution.
Table  II.2  displays  the  difference  between  simulated  and  actual  values
for  the  main  macroeconomic  aggregates. Table  II.3  shows  results  at the
sectoral  level  for  agriculture. Three  comments  are  relevant. First,  the
performance  of the  model  at the  macro  level  is quite  satisfactory:  the
difference  between  estimated  and  actual  values  being  in  most cases  smaller
than 1X.  Second,  the  model is  able to  reproduce  almost  exactly  the  pattern  of
output  in agriculture,  as  well as the  composition  of the  balance  of trade.
Note  that for  maize  and  vegetables  in  particular,  the  differences  between
actual  and simulated  values  are  almost  negligible.
A third  significant  aspect  of the  base solution  is that  the  division  of
the  total  output  of each  agricultural  commodity  between  output  obtained  in
rain-fed  and irrigated  lands  mirrors  the  actual  one.  In  addition,  note that
the  estimated  land  allocations  also  match  the  actual  ones,  implying  in turn
that  estimated  yields  are  very  close  to observed  yields. Unfortunately,  as
mentioned  above,  there  is  no original  data  against  which the  calculated
allocations  of labor  to each  crop  can  be contrasted  which,  although  the
relative  labor  intensities  calculated  are  similar  to the  data in  Norton  and
Solis  (lQ83).
Calibration  for  1991
Significant  changes  occurred  in  agricultural  policies  between  1989  and
1991: (i)  protection  to  maize  was increased  from  471  to 70%, (ii)  tortilla
subsidies  were reduced  substantially,  particularly  in urban  areas,  and (iii)
protection  to other  basic  grains  increased  on average  from  10 to 15Z.
We re-calibrated  the  model  to reflect  these  changes. Starting  from the
1989  base the  changes  just  mentioned  were incorporated  into  the  model,  and the
resulting  equilibrium  was considered  as a benchmark  1991  equilibrium. This
procedure  has significant  drawbacks  in  that the  calculated  1991  equilibrium
cannot  at this  point  be contrasted  with actual  values. Nevertheless,  we
pursued  this route  because  the  changes  are  significant,  and  because  we believe
this  provides  a more accurate  estimate  of the  effects  of the  FTA.
We computed  a 10 year  reference  path for  the  economy,  where  9 years  are
the  adjustment  period  and,  as described  above,  the  tenth  period  summarizes  the
steady-state. The  reference  path  assumes  that  world  prices  are  constant,  but
incorporates  Hicks-neutral  technical  change  and  the  growth  of capital,  labor,17
population  and  real  government  spending  at the  rates  mentioned  above. To
focus  on the  effects  of excluding/including  maize in the  FTA,  the reference
path incorporates  a five-year  liberalization  of the  sector  basic  grains,
beginning  in the  second  period. On the  other  hand,  we assume  that  no
investments  in irrigation  take  place.
TABLE A.2:  NOVEL  PERFORKANCE,  KACRO
observed  Calibrated  % Difference
Veriable  Value  Value  (absolute
value)
Gross  National
Expenditure  511.53  511.12  0.0008
1.  Consumption  334.84  334.58  0.0007
2. Investment  117.81  117.82  0.0000
3. Government  54.45  54.47  0.0003
4. Trade  Balance  4.41  4.24  0.0040
Gross  National
Income  511.53  511.12  0.0008
1. Ua  _es  131.96  136.30  0.0328
2. Rents  26.78  22.89  0.1699
3. Profits  304.97  303.56  0.0046
4. Indirect  Taxes  47.79  48.36  0.0119
Employmentb  21.88  21.88  0.0000
1. Rural  6.00  6.00  0.0000
2. Urban  15.88  15.88  0.0000
a/ milioons  of  millions  of pesos  of 1989;  b7/mi1lions  of  workers.18
TABLE  A.3:  MODEL  PERFORMANCE,  SECTORAL
Agricultural  Observed  Calibrated  X Difference
Sector  Values  Values  (absolute
_  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _ _va  lu  e  )
I  .Maig
GVS  Rain-fedc  3 610  3,601  0.002
GVS  Irrigated'  1.180  1,192  0.010
Rain-fed  Land"  5,553  5,517  0.006
Irrigated  Landb  915  902  0.014
Yistd  Rainfed'1.485  1.491  0.004
Yields  Raln-fet  ~~2,947  3.021  0.025
Yields  Irrigated'  -1083.7  -1077.7  0.005
Net Exports
II-Basic G-ains
GVS  Rain-fed  1,437  1,474  0.025
GVS  Irrigated  3,711  3,713  0.000
Rafn-fed  Land  1,834  2,040  0.112
Irrigated  Land  2,045  2,016  0.014
Yfelds  Rain-fed  1.846  1.702  0.084
Yields  Irrigated  3.925  3.983  0.014
Net Exports  -1754.1  -2165.4  0.234
III  Key  Products
GVS  Rain-fed  2,363  2,383  0.008
GVS  Irrigated  1,609  1,584  0.015
Rain-fed  Land  2,012  2,148  0.063
Irrigated  Land  563  481  0.170
Yields  Rain-fed  7.502  7.088  0.058
Yields  Irrigated  20.190  23.242  0.15t
Net Exports  1305.9  1469.4  0.125
IV Fr.  Ves & Other
GVS  Rain-fed  7,089  7,069  0.002
GVS  Irrigated  9,626  9,620  0.000
Rain-fed  Land  35865  3,557  0.086
Irrigated  Land  1,393  1.515  0.080
Yields  Rain-fed  5.906  6.399  0.083
Yields  Irrigated  23.709  21.783  0.088
Net Exports  745.7  751.9  0.008
i/thousands  of  millions  of  pesos of  1989; b/thousands of  harvested  hectares;  c/tons  per hectare.
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